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Abstract: Evans & Levinson (E&L) argue that language universals are a
myth. Christiansen and Chater (2008) have recently suggested that innate
universal grammar is also a myth. This commentary explores the
connection between these two theses, and draws wider implications for
the cognitive science of language.
It has been widely argued that an innate Universal Grammar
(UG) must be postulated to explain two key observations: first,
that languages share putatively “universal” patterns, which
appear arbitrary from a functional, communicative point of
view; and second, that children acquire language so readily
from an apparently impoverished linguistic input (the “poverty
of the stimulus” argument).
The second point has been the subject of considerable recent
interest, with many theorists arguing that linguistic input is richer
than has previously been suspected (e.g., Pullum & Scholz 2002;
Reali & Christiansen 2005) or that modern learning methods are
richer than is often presumed (e.g., Chater & Vita´nyi 2007;
Harman & Kulkarni 2007). The first argument, based on
language universals, has gone relatively unchallenged in the cog-
nitive science literature – but no longer. Evans & Levinson
(E&L) provide powerful evidence that language universals are
myth rather than reality, and hence, that this line of defense of
UG is swept aside. It remains to be explained, though, how
languages came to display such stunning diversity, and this is
where research on language evolution may offer some insight.
We have recently argued (Christiansen & Chater 2008) that
an innate UG is not merely poorly evidenced, but indefensible
on evolutionary grounds. Specifically, we argue that the
cultural variability of language provides a “moving target,”
which changes too rapidly to support the biological adaptation
that would be required to lead to an innate UG (Chater et al.
2009). Thus, language is best viewed as the product of cultural
evolution, not biological evolution (Christiansen et al., in
press).
The cultural evolution of language does not, of course, take
place in a biological or social vacuum, but rather, is shaped by
multiple constraints. One type of constraint derives from the
nature of the thoughts that language expresses. For example,
whatever the nature of our mental representations, they appar-
ently afford an infinite range of different thoughts, promoting
the likely emergence of compositionality in language (Kirby
2007). Linguistic structure is also shaped by socio-pragmatic
principles relating to the communicative function of language;
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for example, as embodied by Gricean implicatures (Grice 1967).
A further source of constraints on language evolution derives
from the operation of our perceptuo-motor apparatus, which,
for example, enforces substantial seriality in both spoken and
signed languages. Similarly, cognitive limitations on learning,
processing, and memory also provide strong constraints on lin-
guistic structure; for example, our limited working memory pro-
motes a general tendency to resolve ambiguities as quickly as
possible in both linguistic (Clark 1975) and perceptual input
(Pomerantz & Kubovy 1986).
Individual languages are seen as evolving under the pressures
from these constraints, as well as cultural-historical factors
(including language contact and sociolinguistic influences),
resulting over time in the kind of linguistic diversity described
by E&L. Cross-linguistically recurring patterns do emerge due
to similarity in constraints and culture/history, but such patterns
should be expected to be probabilistic tendencies, not the rigid
properties of UG (Christiansen & Chater 2008). Thus, we con-
strue recurring patterns of language along the lines of Wittgen-
stein’s (1953) notion of “family resemblance”: although there
may be similarities between pairs of individual languages, there
is no single set of features common to all languages.
This perspective on language evolution and universals has
important implications for language acquisition and proces-
sing. The ready learnability of language is explicable not
because language fits an innate UG within each child; but
rather, because language itself embodies patterns that are
most naturally acquired from past generations of learners.
We have argued, more generally, that learning cultural forms
(C-induction) is very much easier than learning aspects of
the natural world (N-induction) – because learning merely
requires that each new generations agrees with the previous
generation. For example, the number sequence 1, 2, 3. . .
could be continued in any numbers of ways using repetition
(1, 2, 3, 1, 2, 3, 1. . .), oscillation (1, 2, 3, 2, 1, 2. . .), as a Fibo-
nacci sequence (1, 2, 3, 5, 8. . .), or some entirely irregular
pattern (1, 2, 3, 73, 0, 18. . .). In the context of N-induction,
the learner faces real difficulties: In encountering the
sequence in some aspect of the natural world (e.g., the
number of planets observed on successive nights), it is very dif-
ficult to know how the sequence will continue. However, C-
induction is much more reliable and straightforward. The
vast majority of people would find it most natural to continue
the sequence with “. . .4, 5, 6. . . .” Thus, predicting how
other people will continue the sequence is relatively easy, at
least if people have the same inductive biases. Similarly, chil-
dren must extrapolate a language from the sample of language
they encounter; but such extrapolation is likely to be correct,
given that it is the result of prior extrapolations by previous
generations of learners. Again, the learning problem is dra-
matically easier if the objective is to mirror a cultural form
that has been learned by others. Indeed, through prior gener-
ations of cultural selection, the form itself will have been opti-
mized to embody whatever inductive biases the learner may
have (Chater & Christiansen, in press).
Our emphasis on C-induction in language acquisition dovetails
with a usage-based approach to language processing. Connec-
tionist cognitive science has for some time explored the compu-
tational implications of a usage-based approach to language in
which constituency and recursion are not built into the architec-
ture of the language system but rather emerge through learning
as probabilistic generalizations (Christiansen & Chater 2003).
Importantly, we have developed usage-based models of recursive
sentence processing that are capable of constituent-like general-
ization and have quasi-recursive abilities comparable to human
performance on a variety of complex recursive constructions
(Christiansen & Chater 1999; Christiansen & MacDonald, in
press). Thus, at least some aspects of cognitive science do fit
with the picture of language outlined by E&L, in which recursion
and constituency are not innately defined universals.
E&L’s important paper will substantially shift the debate in
the cognitive science of language. Cognitive scientists have
often taken rigid language universals as a “given,” to be
explained by theories of language acquisition and processing
(e.g., by the postulation of an innate UG). E&L make clear
that this is a mistake – and that a much more nuanced view of
the patterns in the world’s languages is required. We argue
that this perspective is consistent with the view that an innate
UG is as much a myth as language universals; and that language
should be viewed as primarily a product of cultural, rather than
biological, evolution.
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